"IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL MUMBAI BENCH “B” MUMBAI BEFORE SHRI OM PRAKASH KANT (ACCOUNTANT MEMBER) AND MS. KAVITHA RAJAGOPAL (JUDICIAL MEMBER) ITA No. 6880 & 6881/MUM/2025 Assessment Year: 2013-14 & 2020-21 Nobel Biocare India Pvt. Ltd., 2nd floor, SFB-11, Art Build House CTS No. 124, Kurla S.O. Mumbai. Mumbai-400070. Vs. Asst. CIT Circle-15(1)(2), Room No. 483A, 4th floor, Aayakar Bhavan, Maharishi Karve Road, Mumbai-400020. PAN NO. AACCN 0274 A Appellant Respondent Assessee by : Ms. Hinal Shah & Ms. Riddhi Maru (Virtually appeared) Revenue by : Mr. Leyaqat Ali Aafaqui, Sr. DR Date of Hearing : 17/12/2025 Date of pronouncement : 09/02/2026 ORDER PER OM PRAKASH KANT, AM These two appeals by the assessee are directed against two separate orders dated 20.08.2025 and 18.08.2025 , passed by the Ld. Additional/Joint Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals), Panchkula [in short ‘the Ld. CIT(A)’] for assessment year 2013-14 and 2020-21 respectively. Printed from counselvise.com 2. Firstly, we take up the appeal of the assessee for assessment year 2013-14. The grounds raised by the assessee are reproduced as under: Ground no. 1: On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the learned Commissioner of Income Tax adjudicating the claims raised by the Appellant during the appellate proceedings. The Appellant, therefore, respectfully prays that the claims raised during the appellate proceedings be admitted and allowed in accordance w 2. Ground no. 2: Without prejudice to the above ground, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the learned CIT(A) has erred in dismissing the appeal by passing a non of adjudicating the appeal on merit additional claims made by the appellant. The Appellant prays that the impugned order passed by the Ld. CIT(A) is bad in law, illegal and ought to be quashed. 3. Ground no. 3: On the facts and in the circurnstances of the case a learned CIT(A) erred in not granting deduction of provision for obsolete and non already taxed in the preceding years. The Appellant prays that the deduction of Rs. 1,05,44,507 be allowed in the 4- Ground no. 4: On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the learned CIT(A) erred in not granting deduction of provision for sales return of Rs. 39,00,000 which was already taxed in the preceding years. The Appellant pra allowed in the current year. Nobel Biocare India Pvt. Ltd. ITA No. 6880 & 6881/MUM/2025 Firstly, we take up the appeal of the assessee for assessment 14. The grounds raised by the assessee are reproduced Ground no. 1: On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the learned Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) ['CIT(A)'] erred in not adjudicating the claims raised by the Appellant during the appellate The Appellant, therefore, respectfully prays that the claims raised during the appellate proceedings be admitted and allowed in accordance with law. 2. Ground no. 2: Without prejudice to the above ground, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the learned CIT(A) has erred in dismissing the appeal by passing a non-speaking order instead of adjudicating the appeal on merits and failed to consider the additional claims made by the appellant. The Appellant prays that the impugned order passed by the Ld. CIT(A) is bad in law, illegal and ought to be quashed. 3. Ground no. 3: On the facts and in the circurnstances of the case and in law, the learned CIT(A) erred in not granting deduction of provision for obsolete and non-moving inventory of Rs. 1,05,44,507 which was already taxed in the preceding years. The Appellant prays that the deduction of Rs. 1,05,44,507 be allowed in the current year. Ground no. 4: On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the learned CIT(A) erred in not granting deduction of provision for sales return of Rs. 39,00,000 which was already taxed in the preceding The Appellant prays that the deduction amount of Rs. 39,00,000 be allowed in the current year. Nobel Biocare India Pvt. Ltd. 2 No. 6880 & 6881/MUM/2025 Firstly, we take up the appeal of the assessee for assessment 14. The grounds raised by the assessee are reproduced On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the (Appeals) ['CIT(A)'] erred in not adjudicating the claims raised by the Appellant during the appellate The Appellant, therefore, respectfully prays that the claims raised during the appellate proceedings be admitted and allowed in Without prejudice to the above ground, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the learned CIT(A) has erred speaking order instead s and failed to consider the The Appellant prays that the impugned order passed by the Ld. nd in law, the learned CIT(A) erred in not granting deduction of provision for moving inventory of Rs. 1,05,44,507 which was The Appellant prays that the deduction of Rs. 1,05,44,507 be On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the learned CIT(A) erred in not granting deduction of provision for sales return of Rs. 39,00,000 which was already taxed in the preceding ys that the deduction amount of Rs. 39,00,000 be Printed from counselvise.com 2.1 The central issue for adjudication is whether an item of income, erroneously offered to tax by the assessee by way of reversal of provisions, can be taxed twice creation (by way of disallowance) and second at the time of reversal—thereby violating the mandate of Article 265 of the Constitution of India. 2.2 Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that incorporated in December 2004 as a w Nobel Biocare Asia- wholesale trading of NBH’s dental products and solutions in India, as well as for providing marketing, pre and training to customers in Indi 2.3 For the assessment year under consideration, the assessee filed its return of income on 29.11.2013 declaring a total income of ₹2,45,32,000/- under the normal provisions of the Income 1961 (“the Act”) and book profit of 115JB of the Act. The return was selected for scrutiny and assessment under section 143(3) of the Act was completed on 14.03.2016 without making any addition or adjustment to the returned income. 2.4 For the Assessment Year (AY) 2012 provision for obsolete inventory (Rs. 1,05,44,507/ returns (Rs. 39,00,000/ Nobel Biocare India Pvt. Ltd. ITA No. 6880 & 6881/MUM/2025 The central issue for adjudication is whether an item of income, erroneously offered to tax by the assessee by way of reversal of provisions, can be taxed twice—first at the creation (by way of disallowance) and second at the time of thereby violating the mandate of Article 265 of the Constitution of India. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that the assessee was incorporated in December 2004 as a wholly owned subsidiary of -Africa Holding AG (“NBH”) for undertaking wholesale trading of NBH’s dental products and solutions in India, as well as for providing marketing, pre-sale and after and training to customers in India. For the assessment year under consideration, the assessee filed its return of income on 29.11.2013 declaring a total income of under the normal provisions of the Income 1961 (“the Act”) and book profit of ₹1,31,81,815/- 115JB of the Act. The return was selected for scrutiny and assessment under section 143(3) of the Act was completed on 14.03.2016 without making any addition or adjustment to the For the Assessment Year (AY) 2012-13, the assessee created a provision for obsolete inventory (Rs. 1,05,44,507/ returns (Rs. 39,00,000/-) claimed to be made on a scientific basis. Nobel Biocare India Pvt. Ltd. 3 No. 6880 & 6881/MUM/2025 The central issue for adjudication is whether an item of income, erroneously offered to tax by the assessee by way of first at the time of creation (by way of disallowance) and second at the time of thereby violating the mandate of Article 265 of the the assessee was holly owned subsidiary of Africa Holding AG (“NBH”) for undertaking wholesale trading of NBH’s dental products and solutions in India, sale and after-sale support, For the assessment year under consideration, the assessee filed its return of income on 29.11.2013 declaring a total income of under the normal provisions of the Income-tax Act, - under section 115JB of the Act. The return was selected for scrutiny and assessment under section 143(3) of the Act was completed on 14.03.2016 without making any addition or adjustment to the assessee created a provision for obsolete inventory (Rs. 1,05,44,507/-) and sales ) claimed to be made on a scientific basis. Printed from counselvise.com 2.5 In the subsequent year under consideration (AY 2013 assessee suo motu reversed those provisio to tax, believing the prior year's claim would be allowed. However, in the scrutiny assessment for AY 2012 on 16/03/2016 ( i.e. two days after squinty proceedings for year under consideration were competed) disallowed the deduction for those provisions, an action subsequently upheld by this Tribunal. Consequently, the same amounts were added to the total income in AY 2012 2.6 In view of the above, the assessee preferred an app year under consideration and claimed that the income offered to tax on account of reversal of the aforesaid provisions ought to be reduced, as the same had already suffered tax in assessment year 2012-13. The Ld. CIT(A), however, rejected the c that the assessee had not made such claim by filing a revised return and held that no relief could be granted in appellate proceedings. The relevant findings of the Ld. CIT(A) have been reproduced as under: “6.1 On Grounds of Appeal 1 & assessment order, written submissions, relevant appellate records, and judicial precedents. The ITAT order cited by the appellant is for the year Assessment Year 2012 appeal is filed. It is seen question were suo moto offered to tax by the Appellant in its return of income for AY 2013 There is no addition made by the AO regarding these amounts. The fact remains that income, nor was it disallowed by the AO during assessment. The amounts were suo moto offered to tax by the Appellant and have Nobel Biocare India Pvt. Ltd. ITA No. 6880 & 6881/MUM/2025 In the subsequent year under consideration (AY 2013 reversed those provisions and offered the same to tax, believing the prior year's claim would be allowed. However, in the scrutiny assessment for AY 2012-13, which were concluded on 16/03/2016 ( i.e. two days after squinty proceedings for year under consideration were competed) the Assessing Officer (AO) disallowed the deduction for those provisions, an action subsequently upheld by this Tribunal. Consequently, the same amounts were added to the total income in AY 2012- In view of the above, the assessee preferred an app year under consideration and claimed that the income offered to tax on account of reversal of the aforesaid provisions ought to be reduced, as the same had already suffered tax in assessment year 13. The Ld. CIT(A), however, rejected the claim on the ground that the assessee had not made such claim by filing a revised return and held that no relief could be granted in appellate proceedings. The relevant findings of the Ld. CIT(A) have been as under: 6.1 On Grounds of Appeal 1 & 2:- I have have perused the assessment order, written submissions, relevant appellate records, and judicial precedents. The ITAT order cited by the appellant is for the year Assessment Year 2012-13 and not for the year for which appeal is filed. It is seen from the records that the amounts in question were suo moto offered to tax by the Appellant in its return of income for AY 2013-14, The AO has accepted the return as it is. There is no addition made by the AO regarding these amounts. The fact remains that no such deduction was claimed in the return of income, nor was it disallowed by the AO during assessment. The amounts were suo moto offered to tax by the Appellant and have Nobel Biocare India Pvt. Ltd. 4 No. 6880 & 6881/MUM/2025 In the subsequent year under consideration (AY 2013-14), the ns and offered the same to tax, believing the prior year's claim would be allowed. However, 13, which were concluded on 16/03/2016 ( i.e. two days after squinty proceedings for year the Assessing Officer (AO) disallowed the deduction for those provisions, an action subsequently upheld by this Tribunal. Consequently, the same -13. In view of the above, the assessee preferred an appeal for the year under consideration and claimed that the income offered to tax on account of reversal of the aforesaid provisions ought to be reduced, as the same had already suffered tax in assessment year laim on the ground that the assessee had not made such claim by filing a revised return and held that no relief could be granted in appellate proceedings. The relevant findings of the Ld. CIT(A) have been I have have perused the assessment order, written submissions, relevant appellate records, and judicial precedents. The ITAT order cited by the appellant is for 13 and not for the year for which from the records that the amounts in question were suo moto offered to tax by the Appellant in its return 14, The AO has accepted the return as it is. There is no addition made by the AO regarding these amounts. The no such deduction was claimed in the return of income, nor was it disallowed by the AO during assessment. The amounts were suo moto offered to tax by the Appellant and have Printed from counselvise.com been accepted by the AO. Further, the appellate authority cannot consider or allow income or during the assessment proceedings, unless supported by a revised return. The Appellant has not filed a revised return in this case. In view of the above facts and legal position, the appeal filed by the Appellant is dismissed, as the Assessing Officer has merely accepted the suo moto declaration made by the Appellant, and no disallowance or adjustment has been made in the assessment order which can be the subject matter of this appeal. Accordingly, grounds of appeal stands dismissed. 3. The Ld. Counsel for the assessee submitted that the provisions for obsolete and non originally claimed as deduction in assessment year 2012 were disallowed by the A attained finality with the order of the Tribunal dated 03.09.2019. Since the assessee had already offered the reversal of those provisions to tax in assessment year 2013 disallowance was made in asse resulted in double taxation of the very same income. 3.1 It was contended that once the provisions have been disallowed and taxed in assessment year 2012 thereof cannot again be subjected to tax in assessm 14, as such double taxation is impermissible in law. It was further submitted that it is a settled position that the Assessing Officer is obliged to compute the correct taxable income in accordance with law and a mistake or omission on the pa offering income cannot justify levy or collection of tax without Nobel Biocare India Pvt. Ltd. ITA No. 6880 & 6881/MUM/2025 been accepted by the AO. Further, the appellate authority cannot consider or allow fresh claims that were not made in the return of income or during the assessment proceedings, unless supported by a revised return. The Appellant has not filed a revised return in this case. In view of the above facts and legal position, the appeal filed by the Appellant is dismissed, as the Assessing Officer has merely accepted the suo moto declaration made by the Appellant, and no disallowance or adjustment has been made in the assessment order which can be the subject matter of this appeal. Accordingly, grounds of appeal stands dismissed.” The Ld. Counsel for the assessee submitted that the provisions for obsolete and non-moving inventory and sales return were originally claimed as deduction in assessment year 2012 were disallowed by the Assessing Officer and such disallowance has attained finality with the order of the Tribunal dated 03.09.2019. Since the assessee had already offered the reversal of those provisions to tax in assessment year 2013-14 before the disallowance was made in assessment year 2012-13, the same has resulted in double taxation of the very same income. It was contended that once the provisions have been disallowed and taxed in assessment year 2012-13, the reversal thereof cannot again be subjected to tax in assessm 14, as such double taxation is impermissible in law. It was further submitted that it is a settled position that the Assessing Officer is obliged to compute the correct taxable income in accordance with law and a mistake or omission on the part of the assessee in offering income cannot justify levy or collection of tax without Nobel Biocare India Pvt. Ltd. 5 No. 6880 & 6881/MUM/2025 been accepted by the AO. Further, the appellate authority cannot fresh claims that were not made in the return of income or during the assessment proceedings, unless supported by a revised return. The Appellant has not filed a revised return in this case. In view of the above facts and legal position, the appeal filed by the Appellant is dismissed, as the Assessing Officer has merely accepted the suo moto declaration made by the Appellant, and no disallowance or adjustment has been made in the assessment order which can be the subject matter of this appeal. Accordingly, the The Ld. Counsel for the assessee submitted that the provisions moving inventory and sales return were originally claimed as deduction in assessment year 2012-13, but ssessing Officer and such disallowance has attained finality with the order of the Tribunal dated 03.09.2019. Since the assessee had already offered the reversal of those 14 before the 13, the same has resulted in double taxation of the very same income. It was contended that once the provisions have been 13, the reversal thereof cannot again be subjected to tax in assessment year 2013- 14, as such double taxation is impermissible in law. It was further submitted that it is a settled position that the Assessing Officer is obliged to compute the correct taxable income in accordance with rt of the assessee in offering income cannot justify levy or collection of tax without Printed from counselvise.com authority of law, having regard to Article 265 of the Constitution of India. 3.2 Reliance was placed on the judgment of the Hon’ble Delhi High Court in CIT v. Bharat Alu as on the decision of the Hon’ble Jurisdictional High Court in v. Pruthvi Brokers & Shareholders Pvt. Ltd. (349 ITR 336) wherein it has been held that an assessee is entitled to raise additional claims before app were not made in the return of income or by filing a revised return. 4. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the submissions the parties and perused the relevant material on record but merit in the contention advanced on behalf of the assessee. The undisputed facts reveal that the provisions for obsolete and non moving inventory and sales return were disallowed and taxed in assessment year 2012 by the Tribunal. Consequently, the very same amounts cannot be subjected to tax once again in assessment year 2013 because the assessee, prior to such disallowance, had reversed the provisions and offered the same to tax. 4.1 The reversal was made by the assessee in the normal course, before the disallowance was finally determined in assessment year 2012-13. Therefore, no adverse inference can be drawn against the assessee for having offered the amount to tax at that stage. To Nobel Biocare India Pvt. Ltd. ITA No. 6880 & 6881/MUM/2025 authority of law, having regard to Article 265 of the Constitution of Reliance was placed on the judgment of the Hon’ble Delhi High CIT v. Bharat Aluminium Co. Ltd. (303 ITR 256) as on the decision of the Hon’ble Jurisdictional High Court in v. Pruthvi Brokers & Shareholders Pvt. Ltd. (349 ITR 336) wherein it has been held that an assessee is entitled to raise additional claims before appellate authorities even if such claims were not made in the return of income or by filing a revised return. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the submissions the parties and perused the relevant material on record but merit in the contention advanced on behalf of the assessee. The undisputed facts reveal that the provisions for obsolete and non moving inventory and sales return were disallowed and taxed in assessment year 2012-13 and such disallowance has been aff by the Tribunal. Consequently, the very same amounts cannot be subjected to tax once again in assessment year 2013 because the assessee, prior to such disallowance, had reversed the provisions and offered the same to tax. The reversal was made by the assessee in the normal course, before the disallowance was finally determined in assessment year 13. Therefore, no adverse inference can be drawn against the assessee for having offered the amount to tax at that stage. To Nobel Biocare India Pvt. Ltd. 6 No. 6880 & 6881/MUM/2025 authority of law, having regard to Article 265 of the Constitution of Reliance was placed on the judgment of the Hon’ble Delhi High minium Co. Ltd. (303 ITR 256), as well as on the decision of the Hon’ble Jurisdictional High Court in CIT v. Pruthvi Brokers & Shareholders Pvt. Ltd. (349 ITR 336), wherein it has been held that an assessee is entitled to raise ellate authorities even if such claims were not made in the return of income or by filing a revised return. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the submissions of the parties and perused the relevant material on record but find merit in the contention advanced on behalf of the assessee. The undisputed facts reveal that the provisions for obsolete and non- moving inventory and sales return were disallowed and taxed in 13 and such disallowance has been affirmed by the Tribunal. Consequently, the very same amounts cannot be subjected to tax once again in assessment year 2013-14 merely because the assessee, prior to such disallowance, had reversed the The reversal was made by the assessee in the normal course, before the disallowance was finally determined in assessment year 13. Therefore, no adverse inference can be drawn against the assessee for having offered the amount to tax at that stage. To deny Printed from counselvise.com withdrawal of such reversal would result in taxing the same income twice, which is clearly impermissible under the scheme of the Act. 4.2 The Ld. CIT(A) dismissed the assessee's claim on a narrow technical ground, holding that since the income was vol offered in the return and no revised return was filed, the appellate authority lacked the jurisdiction to grant relief. The Ld. CIT(A) relied on the principle that an assessment which merely accepts a motu declaration does not constitute a \"gr the Act. 4.3 The objection of the Ld. CIT(A) that the claim could not be entertained in the absence of a revised return is contrary to the settled legal position that appellate authorities are empowered to consider and allow legit taxable income, notwithstanding the absence of a revised return. While the AO's power may be limited by the rule in Ltd. v. CIT (2006) 284 ITR 323 (SC) Authorities are co-ext restricted by the absence of a revised return. 4.4 We draw strength from the decision of the Hon’ble Jurisdictional High Court in Shareholders (2012) 349 ITR 336 appellate authorities have the jurisdiction to consider additional claims not made in the return if the facts are available on record. Nobel Biocare India Pvt. Ltd. ITA No. 6880 & 6881/MUM/2025 withdrawal of such reversal would result in taxing the same income twice, which is clearly impermissible under the scheme of the Act. he Ld. CIT(A) dismissed the assessee's claim on a narrow technical ground, holding that since the income was vol offered in the return and no revised return was filed, the appellate authority lacked the jurisdiction to grant relief. The Ld. CIT(A) relied on the principle that an assessment which merely accepts a declaration does not constitute a \"grievance\" appealable under he objection of the Ld. CIT(A) that the claim could not be entertained in the absence of a revised return is contrary to the settled legal position that appellate authorities are empowered to consider and allow legitimate claims to determine the correct taxable income, notwithstanding the absence of a revised return. While the AO's power may be limited by the rule in Ltd. v. CIT (2006) 284 ITR 323 (SC), the powers of the Appellate extensive with those of the AO and are not restricted by the absence of a revised return. We draw strength from the decision of the Hon’ble Jurisdictional High Court in CIT v. Pruthvi Brokers & Shareholders (2012) 349 ITR 336, which categorically held tha appellate authorities have the jurisdiction to consider additional claims not made in the return if the facts are available on record. Nobel Biocare India Pvt. Ltd. 7 No. 6880 & 6881/MUM/2025 withdrawal of such reversal would result in taxing the same income twice, which is clearly impermissible under the scheme of the Act. he Ld. CIT(A) dismissed the assessee's claim on a narrow technical ground, holding that since the income was voluntarily offered in the return and no revised return was filed, the appellate authority lacked the jurisdiction to grant relief. The Ld. CIT(A) relied on the principle that an assessment which merely accepts a suo ievance\" appealable under he objection of the Ld. CIT(A) that the claim could not be entertained in the absence of a revised return is contrary to the settled legal position that appellate authorities are empowered to imate claims to determine the correct taxable income, notwithstanding the absence of a revised return. While the AO's power may be limited by the rule in Goetze (India) , the powers of the Appellate ensive with those of the AO and are not We draw strength from the decision of the Hon’ble CIT v. Pruthvi Brokers & , which categorically held that appellate authorities have the jurisdiction to consider additional claims not made in the return if the facts are available on record. Printed from counselvise.com 4.5 It is well-settled that there is tax can be levied and collected only in accordance with law. An erroneous inclusion of income by an assessee cannot confer jurisdiction upon the Revenue to collect tax which is otherwise not legally due. The state cannot benefit from an assessee' error. If a provision is disallowed at the time of its creation, its subsequent reversal cannot be treated as income again. To do so would result in taxing a fictional surplus. The Revenue’s argument that the assessee is \"bound\" by its original that the primary duty of the AO is to determine the correct tax liability in accordance with the law, not to capitalize on an assessee’s mistake. 4.6 In view of the foregoing discussion the Ld. CIT(A) on this issue and direct the Assessing Officer to grant relief to the assessee by allowing withdrawal of the income offered on account of reversal of the provisions for obsolete and non moving inventory and sales return. 4.7 Accordingly, we set aside the order issue in dispute and direct the Assessing Officer to allow the withdrawal of the reversal of such claim. the assessee are accordingly allowed. Nobel Biocare India Pvt. Ltd. ITA No. 6880 & 6881/MUM/2025 settled that there is no estoppel against law tax can be levied and collected only in accordance with law. An erroneous inclusion of income by an assessee cannot confer jurisdiction upon the Revenue to collect tax which is otherwise not The state cannot benefit from an assessee' error. If a provision is disallowed at the time of its creation, its subsequent reversal cannot be treated as income again. To do so would result in taxing a fictional surplus. The Revenue’s argument that the assessee is \"bound\" by its original return ignores the fact that the primary duty of the AO is to determine the correct tax liability in accordance with the law, not to capitalize on an In view of the foregoing discussion, we set aside the order of his issue and direct the Assessing Officer to grant relief to the assessee by allowing withdrawal of the income offered on account of reversal of the provisions for obsolete and non moving inventory and sales return. Accordingly, we set aside the order of the Ld. CIT(A) on the issue in dispute and direct the Assessing Officer to allow the withdrawal of the reversal of such claim. The ground of appeal of the assessee are accordingly allowed. Nobel Biocare India Pvt. Ltd. 8 No. 6880 & 6881/MUM/2025 no estoppel against law and that tax can be levied and collected only in accordance with law. An erroneous inclusion of income by an assessee cannot confer jurisdiction upon the Revenue to collect tax which is otherwise not The state cannot benefit from an assessee's bonafide error. If a provision is disallowed at the time of its creation, its subsequent reversal cannot be treated as income again. To do so would result in taxing a fictional surplus. The Revenue’s argument return ignores the fact that the primary duty of the AO is to determine the correct tax liability in accordance with the law, not to capitalize on an we set aside the order of his issue and direct the Assessing Officer to grant relief to the assessee by allowing withdrawal of the income offered on account of reversal of the provisions for obsolete and non- of the Ld. CIT(A) on the issue in dispute and direct the Assessing Officer to allow the The ground of appeal of Printed from counselvise.com 5. Now we take up the appeal of the assessee in ITA No. 6881/Mum/2025 for assessment year 2020 by the assessee are reproduced as under: Ground no. 1: On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the learned Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) ['CIT(A)'] has erred in not condoning the delay in filing the appeal, without appreciating the existence of sufficient and reasonable cause for such delay, while passing the order under section 250 of the Income 1961 ('IT Act'). The Appellant prays that the delay in filing the app be condoned. 2. Ground no. 2: On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the learned CIT(A) erred in not providing an opportunity to be heard for the Appellant to explain the issue under consideration, thereby violating the principles of natural justice. The Appellant prays that the order passed by the Ld, CIT (A) is in violation of principles of natural justice and thus, bad in law and ought to be quashed. 3. Ground no. 3: Without prejudice to the foregoing grounds, on t circumstances of the case and in law, the learned CIT(A) has erred in dismissing the appeal by passing a non violation of principle of natural justice instead of adjudicating the appeal on merits in accordance with law The Appellant prays that the impugned order passed by the Ld. CIT(A) is bad in law, illegal and ought to be quashed. 4. Ground no. 4: On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the CIT(A) erred in affirming the addition of Rs. 1,53,70 section 43B of the IT Act to the total income with respect to the bonus paid by the Appellant on or before due date prescribed for filing return of income for the year under consideration. Nobel Biocare India Pvt. Ltd. ITA No. 6880 & 6881/MUM/2025 Now we take up the appeal of the assessee in ITA No. um/2025 for assessment year 2020-21. The grounds raised by the assessee are reproduced as under: Ground no. 1: On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the learned Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) ['CIT(A)'] has erred in ing the delay in filing the appeal, without appreciating the existence of sufficient and reasonable cause for such delay, while passing the order under section 250 of the Income 1961 ('IT Act'). The Appellant prays that the delay in filing the appeal may kindly 2. Ground no. 2: On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the learned CIT(A) erred in not providing an opportunity to be heard for the Appellant to explain the issue under consideration, thereby the principles of natural justice. The Appellant prays that the order passed by the Ld, CIT (A) is in violation of principles of natural justice and thus, bad in law and ought to be quashed. 3. Ground no. 3: Without prejudice to the foregoing grounds, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the learned CIT(A) has erred in dismissing the appeal by passing a non-speaking order in violation of principle of natural justice instead of adjudicating the appeal on merits in accordance with law. The Appellant prays that the impugned order passed by the Ld. CIT(A) is bad in law, illegal and ought to be quashed. 4. Ground no. 4: On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the CIT(A) erred in affirming the addition of Rs. 1,53,70 section 43B of the IT Act to the total income with respect to the bonus paid by the Appellant on or before due date prescribed for filing return of income for the year under consideration. Nobel Biocare India Pvt. Ltd. 9 No. 6880 & 6881/MUM/2025 Now we take up the appeal of the assessee in ITA No. 21. The grounds raised On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the learned Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) ['CIT(A)'] has erred in ing the delay in filing the appeal, without appreciating the existence of sufficient and reasonable cause for such delay, while passing the order under section 250 of the Income-tax Act, eal may kindly On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the learned CIT(A) erred in not providing an opportunity to be heard for the Appellant to explain the issue under consideration, thereby The Appellant prays that the order passed by the Ld, CIT (A) is in violation of principles of natural justice and thus, bad in law and he facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the learned CIT(A) has erred speaking order in violation of principle of natural justice instead of adjudicating the The Appellant prays that the impugned order passed by the Ld. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the CIT(A) erred in affirming the addition of Rs. 1,53,70,532 under section 43B of the IT Act to the total income with respect to the bonus paid by the Appellant on or before due date prescribed for filing return of income for the year under consideration. Printed from counselvise.com The Appellant, therefore, prays that the addition on acc disallowance of bonus expense under section 43B of the IT Act be deleted. 5. Ground no. 5: Without prejudice to Ground 4, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Appellant humbly submits that in case the above claim is not section 43B in the captioned AY, the Appellant be allowed the claim of the payment of bonus in the subsequent year i.e., AY 2021 The Appellant, therefore, prays that the aforesaid addition be deleted, and if not deduction subsequent year i.e., AY 2021 6. Ground no. 6: On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the CIT(A) has erred in affirming the levy of interest of INR 11,34,124 under section 234A of the IT Act alth filed within the due date. The Appellant prays that the aforesaid interest under section 234A of the IT Act ought to be deleted. 7. Ground no. 7: On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the CIT(A) has err under section 234B of the IT Act. The Appellant prays that the aforesaid interest under section 234B of the IT Act is consequential and ought to be deleted. 8. Ground no. 8: On the facts and in the cir CIT(A) has erred in affirming the levy of interest of INR 14,31,832 under section 234C of the IT Act. The Appellant prays that the aforesaid interest under section 234C of the IT Act ought to be deleted. 9. Ground no. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the CIT(A) has erred in affirming the levy of fee of INR 10,000 under Nobel Biocare India Pvt. Ltd. ITA No. 6880 & 6881/MUM/2025 The Appellant, therefore, prays that the addition on acc disallowance of bonus expense under section 43B of the IT Act be 5. Ground no. 5: Without prejudice to Ground 4, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Appellant humbly submits that in case the above claim is not allowed as deduction under section 43B in the captioned AY, the Appellant be allowed the claim of the payment of bonus in the subsequent year i.e., AY 2021 The Appellant, therefore, prays that the aforesaid addition be deleted, and if not deduction of such amount be provided in the subsequent year i.e., AY 2021-22. 6. Ground no. 6: On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the CIT(A) has erred in affirming the levy of interest of INR 11,34,124 under section 234A of the IT Act although the return of income was filed within the due date. The Appellant prays that the aforesaid interest under section 234A of the IT Act ought to be deleted. 7. Ground no. 7: On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the CIT(A) has erred in affirming the levy of interest of INR 44,68,708 under section 234B of the IT Act. The Appellant prays that the aforesaid interest under section 234B of the IT Act is consequential and ought to be deleted. 8. Ground no. 8: On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the CIT(A) has erred in affirming the levy of interest of INR 14,31,832 under section 234C of the IT Act. The Appellant prays that the aforesaid interest under section 234C of the IT Act ought to be deleted. 9. Ground no. 9: On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the CIT(A) has erred in affirming the levy of fee of INR 10,000 under Nobel Biocare India Pvt. Ltd. 10 No. 6880 & 6881/MUM/2025 The Appellant, therefore, prays that the addition on account of disallowance of bonus expense under section 43B of the IT Act be Without prejudice to Ground 4, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Appellant humbly submits allowed as deduction under section 43B in the captioned AY, the Appellant be allowed the claim of the payment of bonus in the subsequent year i.e., AY 2021-2022. The Appellant, therefore, prays that the aforesaid addition be of such amount be provided in the On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the CIT(A) has erred in affirming the levy of interest of INR 11,34,124 ough the return of income was The Appellant prays that the aforesaid interest under section 234A On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the ed in affirming the levy of interest of INR 44,68,708 The Appellant prays that the aforesaid interest under section 234B cumstances of the case and in law, the CIT(A) has erred in affirming the levy of interest of INR 14,31,832 The Appellant prays that the aforesaid interest under section 234C On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the CIT(A) has erred in affirming the levy of fee of INR 10,000 under Printed from counselvise.com section 234F of the IT Act although the return of income was filed within the due date by the Appellant. The Appellant p the IT Act ought to be deleted. 5.1 We note that the Ld. CIT(A) disallowed the appeal of the assessee rejecting the application for condonation of the delay. Ld. CIT(A) refused to condone the delay, inv \"Vigilantibus non dormientibus jura subveniunt\" vigilant, not those who sleep over their rights). The Ld. CIT(A) observed that the assessee remained \"passive and inactive\" for nearly 1,000 days following the Intimation unde issued on 20.12.2021. Relying on various precedents, the Ld. CIT(A) concluded that \"sufficient cause\" was absent and that the law of limitation must be applied with its full rigour to prevent \"perpetual uncertainty.\" The relevant finding under: 5.3 The Appellant has argued that it was under a \"bonafide belief\" that the issue could be adjudicated by the Hon'ble DRP. However, the law is well law does not constitute sufficient cause for condonation of delay. 5.4 The Appellant has tried to portray that it was diligent and had no mala fide intention. However, the chronology of events shows otherwise: Intimation under section 143(1) was issued on 20 December 2021; Statutory appeal period expired on 19 January 2022; The Appellant did not file appeal before the CIT(A) within time, nor did it seek condonation promptly thereafter; Instead, it waited until July 2024 (almost 1,000 days later) after the final order to Nobel Biocare India Pvt. Ltd. ITA No. 6880 & 6881/MUM/2025 section 234F of the IT Act although the return of income was filed within the due date by the Appellant. The Appellant prays that the aforesaid fee under section 234F of the IT Act ought to be deleted. We note that the Ld. CIT(A) disallowed the appeal of the assessee rejecting the application for condonation of the delay. Ld. CIT(A) refused to condone the delay, invoking the maxim \"Vigilantibus non dormientibus jura subveniunt\" (Law assists the vigilant, not those who sleep over their rights). The Ld. CIT(A) observed that the assessee remained \"passive and inactive\" for nearly 1,000 days following the Intimation under Section 143(1) issued on 20.12.2021. Relying on various precedents, the Ld. CIT(A) concluded that \"sufficient cause\" was absent and that the law of limitation must be applied with its full rigour to prevent \"perpetual The relevant finding of the Ld. CIT(A) is reproduced as 5.3 The Appellant has argued that it was under a \"bonafide belief\" that the issue could be adjudicated by the Hon'ble DRP. However, the law is well-settled that ignorance or mistaken interpretation of constitute sufficient cause for condonation of delay. 5.4 The Appellant has tried to portray that it was diligent and had no mala fide intention. However, the chronology of events shows Intimation under section 143(1) was issued on 20 December Statutory appeal period expired on 19 January 2022; The Appellant did not file appeal before the CIT(A) within time, nor did it seek condonation promptly thereafter; Instead, it waited until July 2024 (almost 1,000 days later) after the final order to approach the CIT(A). Nobel Biocare India Pvt. Ltd. 11 No. 6880 & 6881/MUM/2025 section 234F of the IT Act although the return of income was filed rays that the aforesaid fee under section 234F of We note that the Ld. CIT(A) disallowed the appeal of the assessee rejecting the application for condonation of the delay. The oking the maxim (Law assists the vigilant, not those who sleep over their rights). The Ld. CIT(A) observed that the assessee remained \"passive and inactive\" for r Section 143(1) issued on 20.12.2021. Relying on various precedents, the Ld. CIT(A) concluded that \"sufficient cause\" was absent and that the law of limitation must be applied with its full rigour to prevent \"perpetual of the Ld. CIT(A) is reproduced as 5.3 The Appellant has argued that it was under a \"bonafide belief\" that the issue could be adjudicated by the Hon'ble DRP. However, settled that ignorance or mistaken interpretation of constitute sufficient cause for condonation of delay. 5.4 The Appellant has tried to portray that it was diligent and had no mala fide intention. However, the chronology of events shows Intimation under section 143(1) was issued on 20 December Statutory appeal period expired on 19 January 2022; The Appellant did not file appeal before the CIT(A) within time, nor did it seek condonation promptly thereafter; Instead, it waited until July 2024 (almost 1,000 days later) Printed from counselvise.com 5.5 Perusal of the above submission and facts of the case clearly shows the inaction and passiveness of the appellant in discharging the statutory responsibility. This fact shows the inaction and casual attitude of the appellant filed on 11-10 clearly a lapse on the part of the appellant and cannot be considered as bonafide and reasonable cause for delay of 996 days in filing the appe explained by the appellant. In view of these facts, it is clear that the appellant has failed to explain that it was having sufficient cause for not filing the appeal in time. The Appellant has relied o Collector, Land Acquisition Anantnag v. Katiji (167 ITR 471). While the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that liberal interpretation should be given in condonation matters, it has also clarified in numerous other judgments (e.g., P.K. Ramachandran v. State Kerala, (1997) 7 SCC 556) that law of limitation must be applied with all its rigour when no sufficient cause is shown. Liberal approach does not mean condoning inordinate delays without justifiable cause. 5.6 There is legal maxim subveniunt\" meaning that law assists those who are vigilant with their rights and not those who sleep thereupon. It is trite law that filing of an appeal or an application under any Act is a right provided by the concerned statute. This rig obligations including adhering to the time limit prescribed in the statute for filing of such an appeal or application. Sometimes the relevant statute carves out exceptions by granting the competent authority/forum a power to entertain a beyond the prescribed period on sufficient cause. It is in the hue of such an express authorization that the concerned authority/forum can exercise its discretion and condone the delay, if satisfied with the reasonableness of the ca of Income-tax Act, 1961, although section 249(2) of the Act requires the filing of an appeal before the CIT(A)/JCIT(A) within 30 days, sub-section (3) empowers the CIT(A)/JCIT(A) to admit an appeal after the expiry had sufficient cause for not presenting the appeal within the period. As discussed in the preceding para, the present appellant has not been able to show any reasonable cause for filing the appeal la From the facts of the case, it is clear that the statutory right appeal which was vested with the appellant was not exercised within the stipulated time u/s.249(2). Thus, this clearly is a case of laches and is directly the result of deliberate inac the appellant. Therefore, the law cannot come to its rescue by condoning the delay for such inaction on the part of the appellant. Nobel Biocare India Pvt. Ltd. ITA No. 6880 & 6881/MUM/2025 5.5 Perusal of the above submission and facts of the case clearly shows the inaction and passiveness of the appellant in discharging the statutory responsibility. This fact shows the inaction and casual attitude of the appellant towards filing of appeal as the appeal was 10-2024, after a lapse of 996 days. This shows that it is clearly a lapse on the part of the appellant and cannot be considered as bonafide and reasonable cause for delay of 996 days in filing the appeal. It is settled law that delay of each day is to be explained by the appellant. In view of these facts, it is clear that the appellant has failed to explain that it was having sufficient cause for not filing the appeal in time. The Appellant has relied o Collector, Land Acquisition Anantnag v. Katiji (167 ITR 471). While the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that liberal interpretation should be given in condonation matters, it has also clarified in numerous other judgments (e.g., P.K. Ramachandran v. State Kerala, (1997) 7 SCC 556) that law of limitation must be applied with all its rigour when no sufficient cause is shown. Liberal approach does not mean condoning inordinate delays without justifiable cause. 5.6 There is legal maxim- \"Vigilantibus non dormientibus Jura subveniunt\" meaning that law assists those who are vigilant with their rights and not those who sleep thereupon. It is trite law that filing of an appeal or an application under any Act is a right provided by the concerned statute. This right carries certain obligations including adhering to the time limit prescribed in the statute for filing of such an appeal or application. Sometimes the relevant statute carves out exceptions by granting the competent authority/forum a power to entertain an appeal or application beyond the prescribed period on sufficient cause. It is in the hue of such an express authorization that the concerned authority/forum can exercise its discretion and condone the delay, if satisfied with the reasonableness of the cause in late presentation. In the context tax Act, 1961, although section 249(2) of the Act requires the filing of an appeal before the CIT(A)/JCIT(A) within 30 days, section (3) empowers the CIT(A)/JCIT(A) to admit an appeal after the expiry of the said period if he is satisfied that the appellant had sufficient cause for not presenting the appeal within the period. As discussed in the preceding para, the present appellant has not been able to show any reasonable cause for filing the appeal la From the facts of the case, it is clear that the statutory right appeal which was vested with the appellant was not exercised within the stipulated time u/s.249(2). Thus, this clearly is a case of laches and is directly the result of deliberate inaction on the part of the appellant. Therefore, the law cannot come to its rescue by condoning the delay for such inaction on the part of the appellant. Nobel Biocare India Pvt. Ltd. 12 No. 6880 & 6881/MUM/2025 5.5 Perusal of the above submission and facts of the case clearly shows the inaction and passiveness of the appellant in discharging the statutory responsibility. This fact shows the inaction and casual towards filing of appeal as the appeal was 2024, after a lapse of 996 days. This shows that it is clearly a lapse on the part of the appellant and cannot be considered as bonafide and reasonable cause for delay of 996 days al. It is settled law that delay of each day is to be explained by the appellant. In view of these facts, it is clear that the appellant has failed to explain that it was having sufficient cause for not filing the appeal in time. The Appellant has relied on Collector, Land Acquisition Anantnag v. Katiji (167 ITR 471). While the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that liberal interpretation should be given in condonation matters, it has also clarified in numerous other judgments (e.g., P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala, (1997) 7 SCC 556) that law of limitation must be applied with all its rigour when no sufficient cause is shown. Liberal approach does not mean condoning inordinate delays without rmientibus Jura subveniunt\" meaning that law assists those who are vigilant with their rights and not those who sleep thereupon. It is trite law that filing of an appeal or an application under any Act is a right ht carries certain obligations including adhering to the time limit prescribed in the statute for filing of such an appeal or application. Sometimes the relevant statute carves out exceptions by granting the competent n appeal or application beyond the prescribed period on sufficient cause. It is in the hue of such an express authorization that the concerned authority/forum can exercise its discretion and condone the delay, if satisfied with use in late presentation. In the context tax Act, 1961, although section 249(2) of the Act requires the filing of an appeal before the CIT(A)/JCIT(A) within 30 days, section (3) empowers the CIT(A)/JCIT(A) to admit an appeal of the said period if he is satisfied that the appellant had sufficient cause for not presenting the appeal within the period. As discussed in the preceding para, the present appellant has not been able to show any reasonable cause for filing the appeal late. From the facts of the case, it is clear that the statutory right to appeal which was vested with the appellant was not exercised within the stipulated time u/s.249(2). Thus, this clearly is a case of tion on the part of the appellant. Therefore, the law cannot come to its rescue by condoning the delay for such inaction on the part of the appellant. Printed from counselvise.com 5.7 Reliance is also placed on the judgement of the Hon'ble Mumbai ITAT in the case of Aditya Sapru Vs AC dated 24-06- dismissed on account of delay in filing of appeal and held that: \"We consider it appropriate to adjudicate on the delay rather than merits of the case at the outset c of the delay. We need to examine the issue in the light of facts and the circumstances of the case and also in view of the in terms of section 5 of the Limitation Act, whereby discretion is vested in the Court/Appellate Authority to an appeal or an application, after the expiry of the prescribed period of limitation, if the appellant shows 'sufficient cause' for not preferring the application within the prescribed time. The expression 'sufficient cause' commonly appears in the provisions of order 22 Rule 9 (2), CPC and Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The Court while allowing such application has to draw a distinction between delay and inordinate delay for want of bona fides of an inaction or negligence which would deprive a par 5. \"Sufficient cause\" is a condition precedent for exercise of discretion by the Court for condoning the delay. Courts have time and again held that when mandatory provision is not complied with and that delay is not properl and convincingly explained, the Court cannot condone the delay on sympathetic grounds alone. The law of Limitation is enshrined in the legal maxim \"\"Interest Reipublicae Ut Sit Finis Litium\" (It is for the general welfare that a period be to litigation). 5.1 To understand the scope of the term \"sufficient cause\" in matters of delay, reliance is placed on the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Basawaraj and Ors vs The Special Land Acquisition Officer, AIR 2014 SC 746 where the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the sufficient cause does not include the negligent manner in which the applicant had acted or/ and there was a want of bona fide, on his/her part. If a party does not act diligently or remains inactive, it cannot qua exercise discretion in favour of such a party. Condonation of delay is not an automatic right but requires the person requesting it to provide a valid explanation for each day of delay and demonstrate a reaso Cause\" cannot be liberally interpreted, if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides is attributed to the party. In the case of Anshul Agarwal vs New Okhla Industrial Development Nobel Biocare India Pvt. Ltd. ITA No. 6880 & 6881/MUM/2025 5.7 Reliance is also placed on the judgement of the Hon'ble Mumbai ITAT in the case of Aditya Sapru Vs ACIT [TS-881-ITAT -2025 vide which appeal of the appellant has been dismissed on account of delay in filing of appeal and held that: \"We consider it appropriate to adjudicate on the delay rather than merits of the case at the outset considering the enormity of the delay. We need to examine the issue in the light of facts and the circumstances of the case and also in view of the in terms of section 5 of the Limitation Act, whereby discretion is vested in the Court/Appellate Authority to an appeal or an application, after the expiry of the prescribed period of limitation, if the appellant shows 'sufficient cause' for not preferring the application within the prescribed time. The expression 'sufficient cause' commonly appears in the provisions of order 22 Rule 9 (2), CPC and Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The Court while allowing such application has to draw a distinction between delay and inordinate delay for want of bona fides of an inaction or negligence which would deprive a party of the protection of Section 5. \"Sufficient cause\" is a condition precedent for exercise of discretion by the Court for condoning the delay. Courts have time and again held that when mandatory provision is not complied with and that delay is not properly, satisfactorily and convincingly explained, the Court cannot condone the delay on sympathetic grounds alone. The law of Limitation is enshrined in the legal maxim \"\"Interest Reipublicae Ut Sit Finis Litium\" (It is for the general welfare that a period be to litigation). 5.1 To understand the scope of the term \"sufficient cause\" in matters of delay, reliance is placed on the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Basawaraj and Ors vs The Special Land Acquisition Officer, AIR 2014 SC 746 where the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the sufficient cause does not include the negligent manner in which the applicant had acted or/ and there was a want of bona fide, on his/her part. If a party does not act diligently or remains inactive, it cannot qualify as sufficient ground allowing the court to exercise discretion in favour of such a party. Condonation of delay is not an automatic right but requires the person requesting it to provide a valid explanation for each day of delay and demonstrate a reasonable cause. \"Sufficient Cause\" cannot be liberally interpreted, if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides is attributed to the party. In the case of Anshul Agarwal vs New Okhla Industrial Development Nobel Biocare India Pvt. Ltd. 13 No. 6880 & 6881/MUM/2025 5.7 Reliance is also placed on the judgement of the Hon'ble Mumbai ITAT-2025(Mum)] 2025 vide which appeal of the appellant has been dismissed on account of delay in filing of appeal and held that: - \"We consider it appropriate to adjudicate on the delay rather onsidering the enormity of the delay. We need to examine the issue in the light of facts and the circumstances of the case and also in view of the in terms of section 5 of the Limitation Act, whereby discretion is vested in the Court/Appellate Authority to admit an appeal or an application, after the expiry of the prescribed period of limitation, if the appellant shows 'sufficient cause' for not preferring the application within the prescribed time. The expression 'sufficient cause' commonly appears in the provisions of order 22 Rule 9 (2), CPC and Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The Court while allowing such application has to draw a distinction between delay and inordinate delay for want of bona fides of an inaction or negligence which would 5. \"Sufficient cause\" is a condition precedent for exercise of discretion by the Court for condoning the delay. Courts have time and again held that when mandatory provision is not y, satisfactorily and convincingly explained, the Court cannot condone the delay on sympathetic grounds alone. The law of Limitation is enshrined in the legal maxim \"\"Interest Reipublicae Ut Sit Finis Litium\" (It is for the general welfare that a period be put 5.1 To understand the scope of the term \"sufficient cause\" in matters of delay, reliance is placed on the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Basawaraj and Ors vs The Special Land Acquisition Officer, AIR 2014 SC 746 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the sufficient cause does not include the negligent manner in which the applicant had acted or/ and there was a want of bona fide, on his/her part. If a party does not act diligently or remains inactive, it lify as sufficient ground allowing the court to exercise discretion in favour of such a party. Condonation of delay is not an automatic right but requires the person requesting it to provide a valid explanation for each day of nable cause. \"Sufficient Cause\" cannot be liberally interpreted, if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides is attributed to the party. In the case of Anshul Agarwal vs New Okhla Industrial Development Printed from counselvise.com Authority (2011) 14 SCC 578, the hon'ble Apex Court that the reason provided for the delay must be something beyond the individual's control that prevented them from approaching the Court. THE TAX 5.2 It is well established in law that the period of limitation has to be construed somewhat strictly as vesting for one and taking away right from the other. To condone the delay in a mechanical or a routine manner may amount to jeopardizing the legislative intent behind Section 5 of the Act. Where the parties chose to sleep over their r for prolonged periods without any just cause, can hardly claim equity in justice particularly faced with the statutory provisions of Section 5. In construing enactments which provide period of limitation for institution of proceedings, the purpose is from a certain event, a proceeding will not be entertained where a strict grammatical construction is normally the safe guide. 5.3 The hon'ble Apex Court in the case of N. Balakrishnan V. M. Krishnamurth \"11. Rules of limitation are meant to see that parties do not resort dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. Law o span for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and the wasted time would never revisit. During efflux of time newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal rem by approaching the courts. So a life span must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for laundering the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fi 5.4 In the case of State of West Bengal vs. Administrator, Howrah Municipality, AIR 1972 SC 749, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that: .parties must act bonafidely, expeditiously and with due care. A casual or a negligent litigant who utter irresponsible attitude, cannot claim the condonation of delay in law when the right has accrued to the other side. The expression \"sufficient cause\" will always have relevancy to reasonableness. The actions which can be condoned by Nobel Biocare India Pvt. Ltd. ITA No. 6880 & 6881/MUM/2025 Authority (2011) 14 SCC 578, the hon'ble Apex Court that the reason provided for the delay must be something beyond the individual's control that prevented them from approaching the Court. THE TAX 5.2 It is well established in law that the period of limitation has to be construed somewhat strictly as it has the effect of vesting for one and taking away right from the other. To condone the delay in a mechanical or a routine manner may amount to jeopardizing the legislative intent behind Section 5 of the Act. Where the parties chose to sleep over their r for prolonged periods without any just cause, can hardly claim equity in justice particularly faced with the statutory provisions of Section 5. In construing enactments which provide period of limitation for institution of proceedings, the purpose is to intimate people that after lapse of certain time from a certain event, a proceeding will not be entertained where a strict grammatical construction is normally the safe 5.3 The hon'ble Apex Court in the case of N. Balakrishnan V. M. Krishnamurthy, AIR 1998 SC 3222 held as under: \"11. Rules of limitation are meant to see that parties do not resort dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. Law of limitation fixes a life span for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and the wasted time would never revisit. During efflux of time newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal rem by approaching the courts. So a life span must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for laundering the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time. 5.4 In the case of State of West Bengal vs. Administrator, Howrah Municipality, AIR 1972 SC 749, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that: - .parties must act bonafidely, expeditiously and with due care. A casual or a negligent litigant who has acted with utter irresponsible attitude, cannot claim the condonation of delay in law when the right has accrued to the other side. The expression \"sufficient cause\" will always have relevancy to reasonableness. The actions which can be condoned by Nobel Biocare India Pvt. Ltd. 14 No. 6880 & 6881/MUM/2025 Authority (2011) 14 SCC 578, the hon'ble Apex Court held that the reason provided for the delay must be something beyond the individual's control that prevented them from 5.2 It is well established in law that the period of limitation it has the effect of vesting for one and taking away right from the other. To condone the delay in a mechanical or a routine manner may amount to jeopardizing the legislative intent behind Section 5 of the Act. Where the parties chose to sleep over their rights for prolonged periods without any just cause, can hardly claim equity in justice particularly faced with the statutory provisions of Section 5. In construing enactments which provide period of limitation for institution of proceedings, the to intimate people that after lapse of certain time from a certain event, a proceeding will not be entertained where a strict grammatical construction is normally the safe 5.3 The hon'ble Apex Court in the case of N. Balakrishnan V. y, AIR 1998 SC 3222 held as under: \"11. Rules of limitation are meant to see that parties do not resort dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage f limitation fixes a life span for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and the wasted time would never revisit. During efflux of time newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a life span must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for laundering the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept 5.4 In the case of State of West Bengal vs. Administrator, Howrah Municipality, AIR 1972 SC 749, the Hon'ble Supreme .parties must act bonafidely, expeditiously and with due has acted with utter irresponsible attitude, cannot claim the condonation of delay in law when the right has accrued to the other side. The expression \"sufficient cause\" will always have relevancy to reasonableness. The actions which can be condoned by Printed from counselvise.com the Court should fall within the realm of normal human conduct or normal conduct of a litigant. It is neither expected nor can it be a normal conduct of a public servant or a litigant that they would months together on 5.5 The Hon'ble Delhi High Court in its decision in the case Surinder Kumar Boveja Vs. CWT 287 ITR 52 has categorically held that delays cannot be routinely excused. In this decision, the Hon'ble High Court has further held as under: \"Where show that the delay had occurred in spite of exercise of due attention and diligence, the assessee cannot complain, if the delay is not condoned.\" 5.6 In the decision rendered in the case of Rankak and V Rewa Coalfields Ltd. reported at AIR 1962 SC 361, the hon'ble Apex Court has held that the party has to show reason for delay on the last day of the limitation period and for each day thereafter. It was further held that condonation is not a matter discretionary jurisdiction. 5.7 The issue of condonation of delay had come up before Hon'ble Orissa High Court in the case of Brijbandhu Nanda (44 ITR 688). The delay was not condoned by the Tribunal and on f there is no justification for the delay as under: \"Even assuming that the questions referred are questions of law, I am of opinion that there was no error on the part of the Tribunal in not condoning the as appears from the assessee's own petition for condonation of delay in I.T.A. Nos. 85, 86 and 87 of 1954 5, 1955, the assessee does not appear to have explained why he waited for 56 days after he received the February 5, 1954, as aforesaid. It further appears from a letter dated April 9, 1954, from the Assistant Registrar of the Appellate Tribunal, Bombay, that the appeals were received by him on April 7, 1954, that is to say, one day beyond the period of limitation. In view of sub provides that a memorandum of appeal, sent by post, shall be deemed to have been presented to the Registrar or to the officer authorised by the Registrar, on the day on which it is received in the o Nobel Biocare India Pvt. Ltd. ITA No. 6880 & 6881/MUM/2025 e Court should fall within the realm of normal human conduct or normal conduct of a litigant. It is neither expected nor can it be a normal conduct of a public servant or a litigant that they would keep the files unmoved, unprocessed for months together on their tables. 5.5 The Hon'ble Delhi High Court in its decision in the case Surinder Kumar Boveja Vs. CWT 287 ITR 52 has categorically held that delays cannot be routinely excused. In this decision, the Hon'ble High Court has further held as \"Where the delay is prolonged and the assessee is not able to show that the delay had occurred in spite of exercise of due attention and diligence, the assessee cannot complain, if the delay is not condoned.\" 5.6 In the decision rendered in the case of Rankak and V Rewa Coalfields Ltd. reported at AIR 1962 SC 361, the hon'ble Apex Court has held that the party has to show reason for delay on the last day of the limitation period and for each day thereafter. It was further held that condonation is not a matter of right and that the Courts have to exercise discretionary jurisdiction. 5.7 The issue of condonation of delay had come up before Hon'ble Orissa High Court in the case of Brijbandhu Nanda (44 ITR 688). The delay was not condoned by the Tribunal and on further appeal, the Hon'ble High Court had held that there is no justification for the delay as under: \"Even assuming that the questions referred are questions of law, I am of opinion that there was no error on the part of the Tribunal in not condoning the delay in Its discretion. In fact, as appears from the assessee's own petition for condonation of delay in I.T.A. Nos. 85, 86 and 87 of 1954-55 dated May 5, 1955, the assessee does not appear to have explained why he waited for 56 days after he received the February 5, 1954, as aforesaid. It further appears from a dated April 9, 1954, from the Assistant Registrar of the Appellate Tribunal, Bombay, that the appeals were received by him on April 7, 1954, that is to say, one day beyond the d of limitation. In view of sub-rule (2) of rule 7, which provides that a memorandum of appeal, sent by post, shall be deemed to have been presented to the Registrar or to the officer authorised by the Registrar, on the day on which it is received in the office of the Tribunal at Bombay, it is clear Nobel Biocare India Pvt. Ltd. 15 No. 6880 & 6881/MUM/2025 e Court should fall within the realm of normal human conduct or normal conduct of a litigant. It is neither expected nor can it be a normal conduct of a public servant or a litigant keep the files unmoved, unprocessed for 5.5 The Hon'ble Delhi High Court in its decision in the case Surinder Kumar Boveja Vs. CWT 287 ITR 52 has categorically held that delays cannot be routinely excused. In this decision, the Hon'ble High Court has further held as the delay is prolonged and the assessee is not able to show that the delay had occurred in spite of exercise of due attention and diligence, the assessee cannot complain, if the 5.6 In the decision rendered in the case of Rankak and Ors. V Rewa Coalfields Ltd. reported at AIR 1962 SC 361, the hon'ble Apex Court has held that the party has to show reason for delay on the last day of the limitation period and for each day thereafter. It was further held that condonation of right and that the Courts have to exercise 5.7 The issue of condonation of delay had come up before Hon'ble Orissa High Court in the case of Brijbandhu Nanda (44 ITR 688). The delay was not condoned by the Tribunal urther appeal, the Hon'ble High Court had held that \"Even assuming that the questions referred are questions of law, I am of opinion that there was no error on the part of the delay in Its discretion. In fact, as appears from the assessee's own petition for condonation 55 dated May 5, 1955, the assessee does not appear to have explained why he waited for 56 days after he received the order on February 5, 1954, as aforesaid. It further appears from a dated April 9, 1954, from the Assistant Registrar of the Appellate Tribunal, Bombay, that the appeals were received by him on April 7, 1954, that is to say, one day beyond the rule (2) of rule 7, which provides that a memorandum of appeal, sent by post, shall be deemed to have been presented to the Registrar or to the officer authorised by the Registrar, on the day on which it is ffice of the Tribunal at Bombay, it is clear Printed from counselvise.com that the appeals were received by the Registrar out of time. We have discussed the general mandatory aspect of the provisions of the Act and the rules thereunder in our decision in Govinda Chowdhury V. Commissio referred to above. Thus, even the delay of one day was not condoned by the Hon'ble Orissa High Court. 5.8 Moreover, in cases where the assessee has not come up clean and the reasons given are not based on facts, the delay cannot be condon was so decided in the case of Mewa Ram (Deceased by L. Rs) &Ors. v. State of Haryana, AIR 1987 SC 45. The Hon'ble Supreme Court have time and again held that when mandatory provision is not complied with and that delay is not properly satisfactorily and convincingly explained, the court cannot condone the delay on sympathetic grounds alone. In the case of Jagdish Lal and Others V.s State of Haryana (1996) 6 SCC 267 wherein it was observed by the Hon'ble court that the appel period and suddenly decided to file the appeal. Again, Hon'ble High Court of Rajasthan & Others, in the case of M/s. Binami Cement Limited Vs. State of Rajasthan & Others, (S.B. (sales Tax) Revision Petition No.556/2011) decided that delay in filing the appeal cannot be condoned for the reason that appellant failed to explain the specifically the delay for the courts, including the Supreme Court, no doubt have recommended liberal app condonation of delay, yet the concepts such as liberal approach, justice cannot be employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation especially when on facts the authorit application under section 5 of Limitation Act is filed, finds no justification for the delay. 5.9 It has been held by the Courts that while considering the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act, the courts do not enjoy unlimited and the discretion has to be exercised within reasonable bounds. It has been further held that the discretion under section 5 of the Limitation Act has to be systematically exercised duly informed by reasons and that whim fancies, prejudices or predilections cannot and should not form the basis of exercising the discretionary powers to condone delay. In the case of Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Limited Vs. Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation [(2010) 5 SCC 4 Nobel Biocare India Pvt. Ltd. ITA No. 6880 & 6881/MUM/2025 that the appeals were received by the Registrar out of time. We have discussed the general mandatory aspect of the provisions of the Act and the rules thereunder in our decision in Govinda Chowdhury V. Commissioner of Income referred to above. Thus, even the delay of one day was not condoned by the Hon'ble Orissa High Court. 5.8 Moreover, in cases where the assessee has not come up clean and the reasons given are not based on facts, the delay cannot be condoned merely because of sympathy. It was so decided in the case of Mewa Ram (Deceased by L. Rs) &Ors. v. State of Haryana, AIR 1987 SC 45. The Hon'ble Supreme Court have time and again held that when mandatory provision is not complied with and that delay is not properly satisfactorily and convincingly explained, the court cannot condone the delay on sympathetic grounds alone. In the case of Jagdish Lal and Others V.s State of Haryana (1996) 6 SCC 267 wherein it was observed by the Hon'ble court that the appellant kept on sleeping for the period and suddenly decided to file the appeal. Again, Hon'ble High Court of Rajasthan & Others, in the case of M/s. Binami Cement Limited Vs. State of Rajasthan & Others, (S.B. (sales Tax) Revision Petition No.556/2011) ed that delay in filing the appeal cannot be condoned for the reason that appellant failed to explain the specifically the delay for the particular period. It has been held that the courts, including the Supreme Court, no doubt have recommended liberal approach in considering applications for condonation of delay, yet the concepts such as liberal approach, justice- oriented approach and substantial justice cannot be employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation especially when on facts the authority before which application under section 5 of Limitation Act is filed, finds no justification for the delay. 5.9 It has been held by the Courts that while considering the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act, the courts do not enjoy unlimited and unbridled discretionary powers and the discretion has to be exercised within reasonable bounds. It has been further held that the discretion under section 5 of the Limitation Act has to be systematically exercised duly informed by reasons and that whim fancies, prejudices or predilections cannot and should not form the basis of exercising the discretionary powers to condone delay. In the case of Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Limited Vs. Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation [(2010) 5 SCC 4591, the Hon'ble Supreme Court Nobel Biocare India Pvt. Ltd. 16 No. 6880 & 6881/MUM/2025 that the appeals were received by the Registrar out of time. We have discussed the general mandatory aspect of the provisions of the Act and the rules thereunder in our decision ner of Income-tax referred to above. Thus, even the delay of one day was not 5.8 Moreover, in cases where the assessee has not come up clean and the reasons given are not based on facts, the ed merely because of sympathy. It was so decided in the case of Mewa Ram (Deceased by L. Rs) &Ors. v. State of Haryana, AIR 1987 SC 45. The Hon'ble Supreme Court have time and again held that when mandatory provision is not complied with and that delay is not properly satisfactorily and convincingly explained, the court cannot condone the delay on sympathetic grounds alone. In the case of Jagdish Lal and Others V.s State of Haryana (1996) 6 SCC 267 wherein it was observed by the lant kept on sleeping for the period and suddenly decided to file the appeal. Again, Hon'ble High Court of Rajasthan & Others, in the case of M/s. Binami Cement Limited Vs. State of Rajasthan & Others, (S.B. (sales Tax) Revision Petition No.556/2011) ed that delay in filing the appeal cannot be condoned for the reason that appellant failed to explain the specifically particular period. It has been held that the courts, including the Supreme Court, no doubt have roach in considering applications for condonation of delay, yet the concepts such as liberal oriented approach and substantial justice cannot be employed to jettison the substantial law of y before which application under section 5 of Limitation Act is filed, finds no 5.9 It has been held by the Courts that while considering the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act, the courts and unbridled discretionary powers and the discretion has to be exercised within reasonable bounds. It has been further held that the discretion under section 5 of the Limitation Act has to be systematically exercised duly informed by reasons and that whims or fancies, prejudices or predilections cannot and should not form the basis of exercising the discretionary powers to condone delay. In the case of Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Limited Vs. Gujarat Industrial Development 591, the Hon'ble Supreme Court Printed from counselvise.com has held that even while a liberal approach is desirable in condoning the delay of short duration, stricter approach is required to be applied in cases of inordinate delay. 6. Thus, it is a settled law that the assessee must he was diligent in taking proper steps and the delay was caused notwithstanding his due diligence. It is for him to explain the reason for the delay and it is not the function of authorities to find the cause for delay. The Appellate Authority ha been shown by the appellant for condoning the delay and whether such cause is acceptable or not. Even though substantial justice should not be defeated by technicalities but that does not mean that any plea wit acceptable basis and even without hearing, resemblance or rationality has to be accepted and delay has to be accepted and condoned which shall be against the very spirit of law. The time prescribed for filing the appeal will become meaningless in such an event. 6.1 Perusal of the facts shows that the assessee in the present case appears to be negligent and has not taken appropriate steps to peruse the remedy till 819 days and thus did not take necessary action in filing the appeal the prescribed time. Our aforesaid view is that in absence of a sufficient/reasonable cause leading to the delay in filing of an appeal, the same does not merit to be condoned. 6.2 Further from the facts emanating from the case, it is coming out cle through out has been of prolonging, stretching the matter just to keep the appeal proceedings pending. Thus, on these given facts, we are of the considered view that the delay in filing of the appeal cannot b reason. Though it is well accepted that no appellant derives any benefit by filing a delayed appeal, however the same should not be used as a tool, or an excuse to avoid and prolong and thus delay further consequent the Department. Accordingly, in this case, the assessee has not been able to explain the reason for delay for the entire period and has merely taken a general plea based on general reasons. 6.3 The delay is undoubtedly substantial althoug assessee has claimed that it was mainly on account of wrong advise of his CA who did not give correct advice at the relevant point of time. As a result, the assessee who was Nobel Biocare India Pvt. Ltd. ITA No. 6880 & 6881/MUM/2025 has held that even while a liberal approach is desirable in condoning the delay of short duration, stricter approach is required to be applied in cases of inordinate delay. 6. Thus, it is a settled law that the assessee must he was diligent in taking proper steps and the delay was caused notwithstanding his due diligence. It is for him to explain the reason for the delay and it is not the function of authorities to find the cause for delay. The Appellate Authority has to examine whether the sufficient cause has been shown by the appellant for condoning the delay and whether such cause is acceptable or not. Even though substantial justice should not be defeated by technicalities but that does not mean that any plea without any possible or acceptable basis and even without hearing, resemblance or rationality has to be accepted and delay has to be accepted and condoned which shall be against the very spirit of law. The time prescribed for filing the appeal will become ningless in such an event. 6.1 Perusal of the facts shows that the assessee in the present case appears to be negligent and has not taken appropriate steps to peruse the remedy till 819 days and thus did not take necessary action in filing the appeal the prescribed time. Our aforesaid view is that in absence of a sufficient/reasonable cause leading to the delay in filing of an appeal, the same does not merit to be condoned. 6.2 Further from the facts emanating from the case, it is coming out clearly that the overall approach of the assessee, through out has been of prolonging, stretching the matter just to keep the appeal proceedings pending. Thus, on these given facts, we are of the considered view that the delay in filing of the appeal cannot be condoned in absence of any justifiable reason. Though it is well accepted that no appellant derives any benefit by filing a delayed appeal, however the same should not be used as a tool, or an excuse to avoid and prolong and thus delay further consequent proceedings from the Department. Accordingly, in this case, the assessee has not been able to explain the reason for delay for the entire period and has merely taken a general plea based on general reasons. 6.3 The delay is undoubtedly substantial althoug assessee has claimed that it was mainly on account of wrong advise of his CA who did not give correct advice at the relevant point of time. As a result, the assessee who was Nobel Biocare India Pvt. Ltd. 17 No. 6880 & 6881/MUM/2025 has held that even while a liberal approach is desirable in condoning the delay of short duration, stricter approach is required to be applied in cases of inordinate delay. 6. Thus, it is a settled law that the assessee must show that he was diligent in taking proper steps and the delay was caused notwithstanding his due diligence. It is for him to explain the reason for the delay and it is not the function of authorities to find the cause for delay. The Appellate s to examine whether the sufficient cause has been shown by the appellant for condoning the delay and whether such cause is acceptable or not. Even though substantial justice should not be defeated by technicalities hout any possible or acceptable basis and even without hearing, resemblance or rationality has to be accepted and delay has to be accepted and condoned which shall be against the very spirit of law. The time prescribed for filing the appeal will become 6.1 Perusal of the facts shows that the assessee in the present case appears to be negligent and has not taken appropriate steps to peruse the remedy till 819 days and thus did not take necessary action in filing the appeal within the prescribed time. Our aforesaid view is that in absence of a sufficient/reasonable cause leading to the delay in filing of an appeal, the same does not merit to be condoned. 6.2 Further from the facts emanating from the case, it is arly that the overall approach of the assessee, through out has been of prolonging, stretching the matter just to keep the appeal proceedings pending. Thus, on these given facts, we are of the considered view that the delay in filing of e condoned in absence of any justifiable reason. Though it is well accepted that no appellant derives any benefit by filing a delayed appeal, however the same should not be used as a tool, or an excuse to avoid and proceedings from the Department. Accordingly, in this case, the assessee has not been able to explain the reason for delay for the entire period and has merely taken a general plea based on 6.3 The delay is undoubtedly substantial although the assessee has claimed that it was mainly on account of wrong advise of his CA who did not give correct advice at the relevant point of time. As a result, the assessee who was Printed from counselvise.com banking upon the CA remained unaware of filing of appeal. The assessee has a concerned CA who was also presented before us during appeal. Though we do not find any reasons to conclude that the delay was malafide, the fact remains that the assessee being an individual taxpayer should have been more conscious of his statutory obligations knowing fully well the implication thereof. It is further noticed from the assessment order that the assessee himself attended assessment proceedings. Therefore, certain element of negligence is palpable on his part a consultant would not absolve him of his own responsibility in this regard. In the case under consideration, it is nowhere evident that whether the assessee made any effort or attempt to contact his counsel engaged in the after passing of impugned order appeal order passed by the Id.CIT(A). 6.4 Even in respect of the claim of deduction u/s 54 of the Act, it appears from the record that the stand of the assessee attitude is dilatory and inconsistent which is fact that the assessee made only part compliance before the AO. Before the Id. CIT(A), the assessee made a fresh claim of deduction even in respect of construction cost incurred before the date of sale of the impugned property. Before us, assessee took a fresh ground claiming that it he is eligible even for the purchase of a new property in Bangalore, a claim which was hitherto not raised before the lower authorities. Seen in the light of these above stated facts and legal position eme hon'ble Apex court(supra), we conclude there was no 'sufficient cause' for this unreasonable admitted delay of 819 days in filing appeal before the Bench which cannot be condoned. Accordingly, the condonation applicati bereft of any 'sufficient cause' is hereby rejected. 7. In the result, the appeal is dismissed on account of delay. Since the appeal stands dismissed, there is need to adjudicate on the merits therein\". 5.8 In view of the above discussion and legal position, the delay of 996 days in filing of appeal in this case is not condoned as I am satisfied that there was no \"sufficient cause\" as per section 249(3) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 for the appellant's fail appeal within the prescribed period of limitation u/s 249(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 r.w.s. 5 of Limitation Act and hence the Nobel Biocare India Pvt. Ltd. ITA No. 6880 & 6881/MUM/2025 banking upon the CA remained unaware of filing of appeal. The assessee has also submitted an affidavit of the concerned CA who was also presented before us during appeal. Though we do not find any reasons to conclude that the delay was malafide, the fact remains that the assessee being an individual taxpayer should have been more conscious of his statutory obligations knowing fully well the implication thereof. It is further noticed from the assessment order that the assessee himself attended assessment proceedings. Therefore, certain element of negligence is palpable on his part and putting all the blame on the tax consultant would not absolve him of his own responsibility in this regard. In the case under consideration, it is nowhere evident that whether the assessee made any effort or attempt to contact his counsel engaged in the tax proceedings after passing of impugned order appeal order passed by the Id.CIT(A). 6.4 Even in respect of the claim of deduction u/s 54 of the Act, it appears from the record that the stand of the assessee attitude is dilatory and inconsistent which is evident from the fact that the assessee made only part compliance before the AO. Before the Id. CIT(A), the assessee made a fresh claim of deduction even in respect of construction cost incurred before the date of sale of the impugned property. Before us, assessee took a fresh ground claiming that it he is eligible even for the purchase of a new property in Bangalore, a claim which was hitherto not raised before the lower authorities. Seen in the light of these above stated facts and legal position emerging from the catena of judgement of hon'ble Apex court(supra), we conclude there was no 'sufficient cause' for this unreasonable admitted delay of 819 days in filing appeal before the Bench which cannot be condoned. Accordingly, the condonation applicati bereft of any 'sufficient cause' is hereby rejected. 7. In the result, the appeal is dismissed on account of delay. Since the appeal stands dismissed, there is need to adjudicate on the merits therein\". 5.8 In view of the above discussion and legal position, the delay of 996 days in filing of appeal in this case is not condoned as I am satisfied that there was no \"sufficient cause\" as per section 249(3) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 for the appellant's failure to file the appeal within the prescribed period of limitation u/s 249(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 r.w.s. 5 of Limitation Act and hence the Nobel Biocare India Pvt. Ltd. 18 No. 6880 & 6881/MUM/2025 banking upon the CA remained unaware of filing of appeal. lso submitted an affidavit of the concerned CA who was also presented before us during appeal. Though we do not find any reasons to conclude that the delay was malafide, the fact remains that the assessee being an individual taxpayer should have been more conscious of his statutory obligations knowing fully well the implication thereof. It is further noticed from the assessment order that the assessee himself attended assessment proceedings. Therefore, certain element of negligence is nd putting all the blame on the tax consultant would not absolve him of his own responsibility in this regard. In the case under consideration, it is nowhere evident that whether the assessee made any effort or tax proceedings after passing of impugned order appeal order passed by the 6.4 Even in respect of the claim of deduction u/s 54 of the Act, it appears from the record that the stand of the assessee evident from the fact that the assessee made only part compliance before the AO. Before the Id. CIT(A), the assessee made a fresh claim of deduction even in respect of construction cost incurred before the date of sale of the impugned property. Before us, the assessee took a fresh ground claiming that it he is eligible even for the purchase of a new property in Bangalore, a claim which was hitherto not raised before the lower authorities. Seen in the light of these above stated facts and rging from the catena of judgement of hon'ble Apex court(supra), we conclude there was no 'sufficient cause' for this unreasonable admitted delay of 819 days in filing appeal before the Bench which cannot be condoned. Accordingly, the condonation application being bereft of any 'sufficient cause' is hereby rejected. 7. In the result, the appeal is dismissed on account of delay. Since the appeal stands dismissed, there is need to 5.8 In view of the above discussion and legal position, the delay of 996 days in filing of appeal in this case is not condoned as I am satisfied that there was no \"sufficient cause\" as per section 249(3) ure to file the appeal within the prescribed period of limitation u/s 249(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 r.w.s. 5 of Limitation Act and hence the Printed from counselvise.com appeal instituted belatedly is hereby not admitted and accordingly dismissed in limine. 6. The Appellant cont nor mala fide. The assessee was under a disallowance of bonus under Section 43B the CPC under Section 143(1) concurrent scrutiny asses Officer and the Ld. DRP subsequently failed to adjudicate upon this specific grievance, the assessee was compelled to seek an alternative remedy by filing a belated appeal against the Section 143(1) intimation. 7. We have heard rival submissions of the parties on the issue in dispute. The only limited controversy is whether there was a sufficient cause for delay in filing the appeal by the assessee before the Ld. CIT(A). 7.1 We are of opinion that while the law of limi repose, the expression \"sufficient cause\" under Section 249(3) must be interpreted with a degree of flexibility to ensure that technicalities do not override the cause of justice. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in (1987) 167 ITR 471 enable Courts to do substantial justice. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves Nobel Biocare India Pvt. Ltd. ITA No. 6880 & 6881/MUM/2025 appeal instituted belatedly is hereby not admitted and accordingly dismissed in limine.” The Appellant contends that the delay was neither deliberate nor mala fide. The assessee was under a bona fide belief disallowance of bonus under Section 43B—originally adjusted by the CPC under Section 143(1)—would be addressed during the concurrent scrutiny assessment proceedings. When the Assessing Officer and the Ld. DRP subsequently failed to adjudicate upon this specific grievance, the assessee was compelled to seek an alternative remedy by filing a belated appeal against the Section ave heard rival submissions of the parties on the issue in dispute. The only limited controversy is whether there was a sufficient cause for delay in filing the appeal by the assessee before We are of opinion that while the law of limitation is a statute of repose, the expression \"sufficient cause\" under Section 249(3) must be interpreted with a degree of flexibility to ensure that technicalities do not override the cause of justice. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Collector, Land Acquisition v. Katiji (1987) 167 ITR 471, the power to condone delay is conferred to enable Courts to do substantial justice. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred. Nobel Biocare India Pvt. Ltd. 19 No. 6880 & 6881/MUM/2025 appeal instituted belatedly is hereby not admitted and accordingly ends that the delay was neither deliberate bona fide belief that the originally adjusted by would be addressed during the sment proceedings. When the Assessing Officer and the Ld. DRP subsequently failed to adjudicate upon this specific grievance, the assessee was compelled to seek an alternative remedy by filing a belated appeal against the Section ave heard rival submissions of the parties on the issue in dispute. The only limited controversy is whether there was a sufficient cause for delay in filing the appeal by the assessee before tation is a statute of repose, the expression \"sufficient cause\" under Section 249(3) must be interpreted with a degree of flexibility to ensure that technicalities do not override the cause of justice. As held by the nd Acquisition v. Katiji , the power to condone delay is conferred to enable Courts to do substantial justice. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, the to be preferred. Printed from counselvise.com 7.2 In the present case, the assessee’s inaction was not born of \"casualness\" but of a misplaced reliance on the ongoing scrutiny proceedings. The attempt to resolve the grievance before the DRP indicates that the assessee was indeed pursu the wrong forum or under a mistaken procedural understanding. In tax matters, where an assessee is actively contesting a disallowance in a parallel proceeding, such conduct cannot be termed \"deliberate inaction.\" 7.3 We find that th merits, involving the verification of bonus payments under Section 43B made before the statutory due date. It is a settled principle that the State should not unjustly enrich itself by tax collection through procedural lapses if the tax is otherwise not due. 7.4 The decisions relied upon by the Ld. CIT(A) (such as Sapru and Basawaraj with mala fides or an absolute lack of explanation. Here, the explanation—reliance on the DRP/Scrutiny process rational nexus to the human conduct of a litigant seeking redressal. 7.5 Considering the totality of the circumstances, we are of the view that the assessee did not stand to gain by delaying the appeal. The delay was a result of procedural misguidance rather than a lack of diligence. To deny a hearing on merits in a case involving a clear statutory deduction would be a miscarriage of justice. Nobel Biocare India Pvt. Ltd. ITA No. 6880 & 6881/MUM/2025 In the present case, the assessee’s inaction was not born of \"casualness\" but of a misplaced reliance on the ongoing scrutiny proceedings. The attempt to resolve the grievance before the DRP indicates that the assessee was indeed pursuing a remedy, the wrong forum or under a mistaken procedural understanding. In tax matters, where an assessee is actively contesting a disallowance in a parallel proceeding, such conduct cannot be termed \"deliberate We find that the assessee has a strong prima facie merits, involving the verification of bonus payments under Section 43B made before the statutory due date. It is a settled principle that the State should not unjustly enrich itself by tax collection through edural lapses if the tax is otherwise not due. The decisions relied upon by the Ld. CIT(A) (such as Basawaraj) pertain to cases where the delay was coupled with mala fides or an absolute lack of explanation. Here, the nce on the DRP/Scrutiny process rational nexus to the human conduct of a litigant seeking redressal. Considering the totality of the circumstances, we are of the view that the assessee did not stand to gain by delaying the appeal. was a result of procedural misguidance rather than a lack of diligence. To deny a hearing on merits in a case involving a clear statutory deduction would be a miscarriage of justice. Nobel Biocare India Pvt. Ltd. 20 No. 6880 & 6881/MUM/2025 In the present case, the assessee’s inaction was not born of \"casualness\" but of a misplaced reliance on the ongoing scrutiny proceedings. The attempt to resolve the grievance before the DRP ing a remedy, albeit in the wrong forum or under a mistaken procedural understanding. In tax matters, where an assessee is actively contesting a disallowance in a parallel proceeding, such conduct cannot be termed \"deliberate prima facie case on merits, involving the verification of bonus payments under Section 43B made before the statutory due date. It is a settled principle that the State should not unjustly enrich itself by tax collection through The decisions relied upon by the Ld. CIT(A) (such as Aditya ) pertain to cases where the delay was coupled with mala fides or an absolute lack of explanation. Here, the nce on the DRP/Scrutiny process—provides a rational nexus to the human conduct of a litigant seeking redressal. Considering the totality of the circumstances, we are of the view that the assessee did not stand to gain by delaying the appeal. was a result of procedural misguidance rather than a lack of diligence. To deny a hearing on merits in a case involving a clear statutory deduction would be a miscarriage of justice. Printed from counselvise.com 7.6 Accordingly, in the interest of substantial justice, we condone the delay of 996 days and restore the appeal to the file of the Ld. CIT(A) for adjudication on merits. 7.7 The ground No. 1 of the appeal of the assessee is accordingly allowed. Since we have already restored the matter, the other grounds raised by the assessee 8. In the result, the appeal for assessment year 2013 allowed whereas appeal for assessment year 2020 statistical purposes. Order pronounced in the open Court on Sd/- (KAVITHA RAJAGOPAL JUDICIAL MEMBER Mumbai; Dated: 09/02/2026 Rahul Sharma, Sr. P.S. Copy of the Order forwarded to 1. The Appellant 2. The Respondent. 3. CIT 4. DR, ITAT, Mumbai 5. Guard file. //True Copy// Nobel Biocare India Pvt. Ltd. ITA No. 6880 & 6881/MUM/2025 Accordingly, in the interest of substantial justice, we condone elay of 996 days and restore the appeal to the file of the Ld. CIT(A) for adjudication on merits. The ground No. 1 of the appeal of the assessee is accordingly allowed. Since we have already restored the matter, the other grounds raised by the assessee are rendered academic. In the result, the appeal for assessment year 2013 allowed whereas appeal for assessment year 2020-21 is allowed for statistical purposes. ced in the open Court on 09/02 Sd/ (KAVITHA RAJAGOPAL) (OM PRAKASH KANT JUDICIAL MEMBER ACCOUNTANT MEMBER Copy of the Order forwarded to : BY ORDER, (Assistant Registrar) ITAT, Mumbai Nobel Biocare India Pvt. Ltd. 21 No. 6880 & 6881/MUM/2025 Accordingly, in the interest of substantial justice, we condone elay of 996 days and restore the appeal to the file of the Ld. The ground No. 1 of the appeal of the assessee is accordingly allowed. Since we have already restored the matter, the other are rendered academic. In the result, the appeal for assessment year 2013-14 is 21 is allowed for /02/2026. Sd/- PRAKASH KANT) ACCOUNTANT MEMBER BY ORDER, (Assistant Registrar) ITAT, Mumbai Printed from counselvise.com "